MARIO
BUNGE’S IRRATIONALITY
(A
logical approach)
Julio Cabrera
(Retired professor at the University
of Brasilia, Brazil).
Those who study logic know that there are two
ways to reject an argument: (1) Find some defect in the passage from premises
to conclusion; (2) Reject the premises. However valid the reasoning is, we are
not obliged to accept the starting points from which, by reasoning well, the
conclusions are correctly drawn. This is elementary logic.
Philosophers in general are largely unaware of
their starting points, of the fact that when they think they always do so from somewhere. Or rather, they are
unaware that the results obtained, even correct and coherent, are dependent on
assumptions, premises and starting points that can always be rationally
rejected by the other party. Philosophers tend to regard their conclusions on
some subject as absolute results, unaware that these results are legitimate
only from previous assumptions. A conclusion which does not see itself only as
one perspective among others, make a claim for a primacy that cannot be
rationally justified.
Thus, in the face of any
statement, we always have to consider the referent of the statement - what
the statement speaks about - but also what I call the afferent, the
source from which the statement is made, the premises and assumptions from
which the statement is advanced. These assumptions must be clearly formulated
so that other arguers can be able to accept or reject these assumptions, even
when they are willing to accept without problem that from these assumptions
actually follow the intended conclusions.
For example, if Ortega y
Gasset claims that Debussy is a revolutionary musician (as he states in the
book “The Dehumanization of Art”), this statement speaks as much about Debussy
as about Ortega y Gasset; or rather, this statement refers to Debussy since
Ortega's afference. The statement may be true, but it is not so in absolute
terms. It may be true from the particular perspective adopted by Ortega, from
his conception of music, art, revolution and related concepts, as well as from
his particular knowledge of Debussy, his influences, etc. To consider Ortega's
statement about Debussy as absolutely true or as absolutely false does not seem
rational. More rational would seem to consider, first, whether or not we will
accept the assumptions from which Ortega makes his statement about Debussy;
and, second, whether or not from these assumptions, once accepted, follows the
claim that Debussy is a revolutionary musician.
Recently Mario Bunge stated once more that
Heidegger is a charlatan. What does it means? Does it mean that the statement
“Heidegger is a charlatan” is true, or that this assertion is simply false?
Both would be hasty evaluations. The only thing we can rationally infer at
first glance is that the statement "Mario Bunge considers Heidegger a
charlatan" is true. In order for the statement "Heidegger is a
charlatan" to be considered true as well, the author of the sentence
should be able to state the reasons for making that statement, if questioned by
the other party. If Mario Bunge insists on his statement and does not justify
it, we have no reason to accept it. We need him, for example, to read many
complete texts from Heidegger, analyze them carefully and prove that they are
the texts written by a charlatan. The interlocutors will decide whether or not
to accept their arguments, and can make counterarguments and so on. This is
what we usually do when we do philosophy.
When Bunge refers to Heidegger and the
philosophy of existence in general he is usually quite succinct. He says that
the philosophy of existence is "pseudo-philosophy", which is a
"dark doctrine" that only serves to depress and destroy. It states
that certain writings of Heidegger are simply "nonsense" and that
many of his views were used by Nazism. He criticizes his conception of the
human being as paralyzed in the face of Nothing, and the existentialists' idea
that logic and science are despicable because what really matters is naked
existence. Heidegger's writings would, according to Bunge, be a mixture of
meaningless statements, jargon and falsifications, not a genuine philosophy. I
don't know a text where Bunge studies Heidegger's texts in detail, going beyond
quick quotes of out-of-context sentences. If the reader knows a text like this
please let me know. I am always willing to change my opinions in the light of
new evidence.
To these summary statements about philosophy
of existence one could immediately answer the following. The notion of
"pseudophilosophy" presupposes an earlier notion of what
"philosophy" is; a notion that the opponent can always accept or
reject. Even if, by accepting Bunge's notion of philosophy, it is inferred that
Heidegger is a charlatan, we are not obliged to accept Bunge's notion of
philosophy. We can reject it by argument, showing, for example, that it is too
narrow a conception, which contains unjustified prejudices or limitations and
leaves out much valuable thought about the world and the human. If we do so,
then we may also reject his notion of 'pseudophilosophy'. Similarly, to say
that a certain statement is “nonsense”, we need a framework of what is
meaningful and what is not, and this framework can always be put on the table
and discussed. There are no criteria of what is “significant” or not that
cannot be challenged and discussed. To think that there are absolute criteria
of meaning does not seem to be supported by a genuine scientific, experimental,
plural, open and revisable attitude of the world and of philosophy.
As regards Bunge's other summary criticisms of
Heidegger, from the fact that a philosophy is 'dark', 'depressive' or
destructive of values (let us accept, for the sake of argument, that this is a
fact), it is not logically inferred that it is a false philosophy. A philosophy
could be dark, depressing, destructive and true. To clearly show that from the
dark, depressing and destructive character of a philosophy is logically inferred
its falsity many other additional arguments should be added. Likewise, from the
fact that the Nazis used Heidegger's claims, it is not inferred that these
claims are false. From the undisputed historical fact that Heidegger
sympathized with Nazism is not inferred logically the falsity of none of his
ideas - for example his conception of the human. The philosopher Ernst
Tugendhat, who personally studied with Heidegger and later abandoned
phenomenology and became an analytic philosopher, stated in a book of his that
the Heideggerian conception of the human still seemed to him far deeper and
more fertile than the analytical conceptions of the human. Tugendhat never
doubted Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, but to declare that his conception
of the human must therefore be false is certainly not a logical sequitur.
Heidegger's attentive
readers, even if not especially admirers of his philosophy -my case - could
deny, on the basis of many texts, that Heidegger asserts somewhere that man
should stay paralyzed in the face of Nothing and that logic and science are completely despicable. Heidegger presents a
series of human attitudes concerning the emptiness of existence, for example a
notion of "self-choice" which is far from any attitude of paralysis;
only a very careless reading of Heidegger's texts could have such an idea. Nor
does Heidegger deny that logic and science have their perfectly legitimate scopes
of application; for example, in the epilogue of "What is
Metaphysics?" Heidegger explicitly states that symbolic logic is a
possible interpretation of the essence of thinking, but not the only one;
calculating thinking is not denied, but only situated among other
possibilities. So, that Heidegger really asserts the things that Bunge
attributes to him is at least controversial and gives rise to a long and
interesting discussion that should take place in a rationally guided
intellectual democracy, and which cannot be simply dispelled by quick phrases.
If Bunge or any other
summary critic says that it is not worth wasting time analyzing Heidegger's
texts because it is evident to anyone that Heidegger is a charlatan, we, his
interlocutors in dialogue, can always deny this supposed evidence. We can say
that it is not clear to us that Heidegger is a charlatan, that we are not
convinced by the quick sentences and summary judgments, that we need more proofs,
more textual analysis, more specific and detailed considerations; that it may
happen that we effectively convince ourselves of the truth of the statement
“Heidegger is a charlatan” at the end of careful argumentation; but we cannot
simply accept this statement as trivially true without breaking elementary rational
criteria of argumentation.
Returning to the initial
question, when we come across one statement like “Mario Bunge declares that
Heidegger is a charlatan”, we should be aware that this statement speaks of
both Heidegger and Mario Bunge. We must logically consider two elements, not
just one: referent and afferent. In general, the author of the statement considers
only the reference, what the statement says, or its destination. But it is also
essential to ask about the source of the statement, that is, from what
theoretical and vital place the statement is being made, from what criteria,
which definitions, which conceptions. If not, we risk identifying the
statements: "Mario Bunge declares that Heidegger is a charlatan" with
the statement "Heidegger is a charlatan", which are two statements
with different truth conditions.
When we put a liquid in
a container the liquid accommodates to the shape of the container. We never buy
only whiskey, we always buy a bottle of whiskey; and whiskey takes the shape of
your bottle. It's the same whiskey, but your reception is different. By
analogy, we can say that when someone makes a statement, the content of the
statement accommodates the form of who is making the statement. In the
particular case we can say: “For someone of Mario Bunge's background, values,
beliefs, trajectory, convictions, knowledge, sensitivity, etc., Heidegger's
texts may (or perhaps should) appear as written for a charlatan”. Heideggerian
liquid takes the shape of the Bungian container. And really when we put on
Bunge glasses, it's almost impossible not to see Heidegger as a charlatan. The
problem is that this container is not the only one capable of receiving
Heidegger, that the Heidegger put in this container is not the only possible
way to receive Heidegger, despite the strong psychological persuasion that
makes the author of the statement think like this. Heideggerian whiskey can be
accommodated in a variety of bottles, and the Bungian bottle is just one of
them. To pretend that this one bottle gives us the only definitive way to judge
the content is not a rational stance.
However, this does not
lead us to an abyssal and hermetic subjectivism (someone saying: "Bunge is
being subjective in judging Heidegger"), but to a perfectly sustainable
perspective, amid other perspectives capable of showing different, perfectly
objective, aspects of a philosophy or an author. What these perspectives
discover about something or someone (for example, about Heidegger) is not
subjective; it is perfectly objective; but it is not unique, since the world
can be objectively viewed from different perspectives. There are numerous
perspectives from which to view a philosophy. And it seems perfectly reasonable
to think that from at least one of these other perspectives Heidegger's
writings may appear to be philosophically valuable. It would be unreasonable to
declare that "Heidegger is a charlatan" is a conclusion that derives
universally from any perspective as an absolutely objective and
definitive fact. (This is sometimes intended by phrases such as: “Any
reasonable person would think the same way I do” or “No one who does serious
philosophy would fail to see this”, and the like, where the author of the
phrase tries to garner sympathizers and defend the idea that his-her statement
is objective, absolute and definitive from any point of view).
One of Bunge's targets
has always been "relativism" in philosophy. One might always wonder
why relativism would be more false or more harmful or more dangerous than
dogmatism, why the idea that truth can be attained in many ways would be
more dangerous than the idea that truth can be attained only one way.
Why would multiplicity be more dangerous than uniqueness? Both can be harmful
and dangerous. In fact, the twentieth-century totalitarianisms of both the
right and left wings have never been relativistic or skeptical; they have been
strongly dogmatic, fanatically convinced of a single and undisputed truth. But
leaving this aside and supposing, for the sake of argument, that relativism
does pose a real danger, consideration of perspectives other than one's own
does not lead to a subjective relativism or a vulgar skepticism, but in any
case to a logical relativism that simply states that our conclusions are
always relative to the premises we assumed earlier, and that to mean in the
conclusions more than there was in the premises is a fallacy. We do not know
how the Gods reason, but finite beings like humans can only argue from
assumptions and premises, never from nothing.
Therefore, to say that
what one concludes depends on the assumptions that one departs from is not a
“relativistic” statement, but something that logicians of all times have been
repeating. This means something very important: that Mario Bunge's perspective
on Heidegger being a charlatan is not absolutely false; for it is something
that can be legitimately concluded whenever the assumptions from which Bunge (or
others) makes such a statement are accepted. To the extent that it is not
merely an emotional statement, and to the extent that Bunge has arguments to
defend his stance, what he states about Heidegger is not false; it can be
rationally defended. This means that if we accept all of Bunge's assumptions,
the conclusion could (or perhaps should) be that Heidegger is a charlatan. But
the crucial question is always the same: no one is obliged to accept Bunge's
assumptions; we always have the right - at least in a genuine intellectual
democracy - to have another philosophical background, another sensibility,
other beliefs, other values, other interests, another notion of philosophy,
etc., according to which Heidegger is not a charlatan but an important
philosopher. .
Whenever a philosophical
text irritates us or we do not understand it or it seems irrelevant to us, we
are faced with at least two alternatives: (1) The philosophical text has no
value; (2) The reader is unable - for one reason or another - to grasp the
value of the text. It would not be rational to discard a priori this second
alternative. The most reasonable attitude, given the situation of not being
able to see the value of a text, would be to say: “This escapes my
understanding; it is not a text for me; it's not the kind of philosophy I
prefer to read”, or something like that. It does not seem reasonable to declare
that a philosophical text is of no value simply because I cannot grasp its
value or irritates me. It is not absurd all that I cannot grasp with my
background, my intellectual tools, the constitution of my culture, etc. As
Wittgenstein once said to Russell, "Don't think that everything you don't
understand is nonsense"
One might argue (and it
is quite possible that Bunge would argue) that this overly tolerant attitude
would leave the way open for all sort of charlatans, liars and dishonest people.
He who manifests himself or herself in this way understands that he or she
assumes a kind of crusade in favor of rationality in philosophy, having already
defined rationality perfectly well and identified its transgressors. I fully
agree to advocate rational philosophizing, but I think that rather than
summary offensive or ironic statements (like to say that Heidegger's phrases
are those of a schizophrenic), it is more rational to develop careful and
lengthy lines of argument to try to show that a philosophical writing lacks
value or is the product of quackery or dishonesty, giving opportunity to the other
party of defending and replicating. Certainly, many serious readers of
Heidegger (is it rational to think that they are all wrong or dishonest
or were deceived?) may well come up with counterarguments to show that
Heidegger is a philosopher who has something important to say, and the Bungians
will be able to replicate and so on. This is how we do rational and civilized philosophy.
We have no reason to
organize crusades in favor of a specific way of doing philosophy as if we had
received an illumination of the absolute Good. The only thing we have in
philosophy - at least after the fall of the religious and metaphysical
references of the past - are arguments and counterarguments, not dogmas, not
even rationalistic dogmas. We cannot set out on a redemptive mission previously
guided by an absolute and unchallenged - and perhaps very limited - idea of
what is rational and what is quackery in philosophy.
If Bunge replied that he
agrees with all of the foregoing, and that when he makes statements like this
about Heidegger, it is always elliptically implied that he is merely stating it
from his own perspective, not subjective but never unique, and with no
intention of disqualifying Heidegger absolutely and definitely, so we all agree
and we can drink beer together. If Bunge acknowledges that his statement was
simply an emotional outburst without rational justification, that Heidegger
simply irritates him in a way that cannot be restrained, we also can understand
this, even in a philosopher who has been characterized all his life by the
defense of rationality and science against mere emotional attitudes. But if he
claims that it is not just a simple emotional outburst, but a rational content
that can be defended by arguments, then we are still waiting for these
arguments; not single sentence analysis, but serious and careful analysis of
texts.
I do not believe that we
will build a better world by summarily rejecting, emotionally and without
argument, all that we do not understand or have the patience to examine. If we
think an idea is pernicious or harmful, the only way to counter it is to argue
against it through knowledge, rather than dismissing it as obviously false or
dishonest, assuming the role of a guardian of rationality. One of the ideas
that has brought the world to the brink of war and total collapse is that it
is not worth arguing with the other party, that it must be simply destroyed.
When clashes are not argumentative, they can only be based on violence, even if
cordial or ironic. For to reject a philosophy or a philosopher without
justifying rejection is an act of intellectual violence, which must also be
denounced when Heideggerians and existentialists refuse to acknowledge the
importance of formal logic, scientific method, and philosophical analysis
without knowing anything about the subject.
I hope it has become
clear that in this text I did not intend to defend Heidegger against Bunge (I
leave this to the Heideggerians, for I am really an analytic philosopher). On
the contrary, in this text I have tried to defend rationality against Bunge.
Remark. This occasional article is based
on a way of understanding philosophical discussions in general, which was most
carefully elaborated in my book “Introduction
to a negative approach to argumentation: towards a new ethic for philosophical
discussion”. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, forthcoming.
16:24
Julio Cabrera
