MARIO BUNGE'S IRRATIONALITY

MARIO BUNGE’S IRRATIONALITY

(A logical approach)

Julio Cabrera

(Retired professor at the University of Brasilia, Brazil).

 Those who study logic know that there are two ways to reject an argument: (1) Find some defect in the passage from premises to conclusion; (2) Reject the premises. However valid the reasoning is, we are not obliged to accept the starting points from which, by reasoning well, the conclusions are correctly drawn. This is elementary logic.

 Philosophers in general are largely unaware of their starting points, of the fact that when they think they always do so from somewhere. Or rather, they are unaware that the results obtained, even correct and coherent, are dependent on assumptions, premises and starting points that can always be rationally rejected by the other party. Philosophers tend to regard their conclusions on some subject as absolute results, unaware that these results are legitimate only from previous assumptions. A conclusion which does not see itself only as one perspective among others, make a claim for a primacy that cannot be rationally justified.

Thus, in the face of any statement, we always have to consider the referent of the statement - what the statement speaks about - but also what I call the afferent, the source from which the statement is made, the premises and assumptions from which the statement is advanced. These assumptions must be clearly formulated so that other arguers can be able to accept or reject these assumptions, even when they are willing to accept without problem that from these assumptions actually follow the intended conclusions.

For example, if Ortega y Gasset claims that Debussy is a revolutionary musician (as he states in the book “The Dehumanization of Art”), this statement speaks as much about Debussy as about Ortega y Gasset; or rather, this statement refers to Debussy since Ortega's afference. The statement may be true, but it is not so in absolute terms. It may be true from the particular perspective adopted by Ortega, from his conception of music, art, revolution and related concepts, as well as from his particular knowledge of Debussy, his influences, etc. To consider Ortega's statement about Debussy as absolutely true or as absolutely false does not seem rational. More rational would seem to consider, first, whether or not we will accept the assumptions from which Ortega makes his statement about Debussy; and, second, whether or not from these assumptions, once accepted, follows the claim that Debussy is a revolutionary musician.

 Recently Mario Bunge stated once more that Heidegger is a charlatan. What does it means? Does it mean that the statement “Heidegger is a charlatan” is true, or that this assertion is simply false? Both would be hasty evaluations. The only thing we can rationally infer at first glance is that the statement "Mario Bunge considers Heidegger a charlatan" is true. In order for the statement "Heidegger is a charlatan" to be considered true as well, the author of the sentence should be able to state the reasons for making that statement, if questioned by the other party. If Mario Bunge insists on his statement and does not justify it, we have no reason to accept it. We need him, for example, to read many complete texts from Heidegger, analyze them carefully and prove that they are the texts written by a charlatan. The interlocutors will decide whether or not to accept their arguments, and can make counterarguments and so on. This is what we usually do when we do philosophy.

 When Bunge refers to Heidegger and the philosophy of existence in general he is usually quite succinct. He says that the philosophy of existence is "pseudo-philosophy", which is a "dark doctrine" that only serves to depress and destroy. It states that certain writings of Heidegger are simply "nonsense" and that many of his views were used by Nazism. He criticizes his conception of the human being as paralyzed in the face of Nothing, and the existentialists' idea that logic and science are despicable because what really matters is naked existence. Heidegger's writings would, according to Bunge, be a mixture of meaningless statements, jargon and falsifications, not a genuine philosophy. I don't know a text where Bunge studies Heidegger's texts in detail, going beyond quick quotes of out-of-context sentences. If the reader knows a text like this please let me know. I am always willing to change my opinions in the light of new evidence.

 To these summary statements about philosophy of existence one could immediately answer the following. The notion of "pseudophilosophy" presupposes an earlier notion of what "philosophy" is; a notion that the opponent can always accept or reject. Even if, by accepting Bunge's notion of philosophy, it is inferred that Heidegger is a charlatan, we are not obliged to accept Bunge's notion of philosophy. We can reject it by argument, showing, for example, that it is too narrow a conception, which contains unjustified prejudices or limitations and leaves out much valuable thought about the world and the human. If we do so, then we may also reject his notion of 'pseudophilosophy'. Similarly, to say that a certain statement is “nonsense”, we need a framework of what is meaningful and what is not, and this framework can always be put on the table and discussed. There are no criteria of what is “significant” or not that cannot be challenged and discussed. To think that there are absolute criteria of meaning does not seem to be supported by a genuine scientific, experimental, plural, open and revisable attitude of the world and of philosophy.

 As regards Bunge's other summary criticisms of Heidegger, from the fact that a philosophy is 'dark', 'depressive' or destructive of values ​​(let us accept, for the sake of argument, that this is a fact), it is not logically inferred that it is a false philosophy. A philosophy could be dark, depressing, destructive and true. To clearly show that from the dark, depressing and destructive character of a philosophy is logically inferred its falsity many other additional arguments should be added. Likewise, from the fact that the Nazis used Heidegger's claims, it is not inferred that these claims are false. From the undisputed historical fact that Heidegger sympathized with Nazism is not inferred logically the falsity of none of his ideas - for example his conception of the human. The philosopher Ernst Tugendhat, who personally studied with Heidegger and later abandoned phenomenology and became an analytic philosopher, stated in a book of his that the Heideggerian conception of the human still seemed to him far deeper and more fertile than the analytical conceptions of the human. Tugendhat never doubted Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, but to declare that his conception of the human must therefore be false is certainly not a logical sequitur.

Heidegger's attentive readers, even if not especially admirers of his philosophy -my case - could deny, on the basis of many texts, that Heidegger asserts somewhere that man should stay paralyzed in the face of Nothing and that logic and science are  completely despicable. Heidegger presents a series of human attitudes concerning the emptiness of existence, for example a notion of "self-choice" which is far from any attitude of paralysis; only a very careless reading of Heidegger's texts could have such an idea. Nor does Heidegger deny that logic and science have their perfectly legitimate scopes of application; for example, in the epilogue of "What is Metaphysics?" Heidegger explicitly states that symbolic logic is a possible interpretation of the essence of thinking, but not the only one; calculating thinking is not denied, but only situated among other possibilities. So, that Heidegger really asserts the things that Bunge attributes to him is at least controversial and gives rise to a long and interesting discussion that should take place in a rationally guided intellectual democracy, and which cannot be simply dispelled by quick phrases.

If Bunge or any other summary critic says that it is not worth wasting time analyzing Heidegger's texts because it is evident to anyone that Heidegger is a charlatan, we, his interlocutors in dialogue, can always deny this supposed evidence. We can say that it is not clear to us that Heidegger is a charlatan, that we are not convinced by the quick sentences and summary judgments, that we need more proofs, more textual analysis, more specific and detailed considerations; that it may happen that we effectively convince ourselves of the truth of the statement “Heidegger is a charlatan” at the end of careful argumentation; but we cannot simply accept this statement as trivially true without breaking elementary rational criteria of argumentation.

Returning to the initial question, when we come across one statement like “Mario Bunge declares that Heidegger is a charlatan”, we should be aware that this statement speaks of both Heidegger and Mario Bunge. We must logically consider two elements, not just one: referent and afferent. In general, the author of the statement considers only the reference, what the statement says, or its destination. But it is also essential to ask about the source of the statement, that is, from what theoretical and vital place the statement is being made, from what criteria, which definitions, which conceptions. If not, we risk identifying the statements: "Mario Bunge declares that Heidegger is a charlatan" with the statement "Heidegger is a charlatan", which are two statements with different truth conditions.

When we put a liquid in a container the liquid accommodates to the shape of the container. We never buy only whiskey, we always buy a bottle of whiskey; and whiskey takes the shape of your bottle. It's the same whiskey, but your reception is different. By analogy, we can say that when someone makes a statement, the content of the statement accommodates the form of who is making the statement. In the particular case we can say: “For someone of Mario Bunge's background, values, beliefs, trajectory, convictions, knowledge, sensitivity, etc., Heidegger's texts may (or perhaps should) appear as written for a charlatan”. Heideggerian liquid takes the shape of the Bungian container. And really when we put on Bunge glasses, it's almost impossible not to see Heidegger as a charlatan. The problem is that this container is not the only one capable of receiving Heidegger, that the Heidegger put in this container is not the only possible way to receive Heidegger, despite the strong psychological persuasion that makes the author of the statement think like this. Heideggerian whiskey can be accommodated in a variety of bottles, and the Bungian bottle is just one of them. To pretend that this one bottle gives us the only definitive way to judge the content is not a rational stance.

However, this does not lead us to an abyssal and hermetic subjectivism (someone saying: "Bunge is being subjective in judging Heidegger"), but to a perfectly sustainable perspective, amid other perspectives capable of showing different, perfectly objective, aspects of a philosophy or an author. What these perspectives discover about something or someone (for example, about Heidegger) is not subjective; it is perfectly objective; but it is not unique, since the world can be objectively viewed from different perspectives. There are numerous perspectives from which to view a philosophy. And it seems perfectly reasonable to think that from at least one of these other perspectives Heidegger's writings may appear to be philosophically valuable. It would be unreasonable to declare that "Heidegger is a charlatan" is a conclusion that derives universally from any perspective as an absolutely objective and definitive fact. (This is sometimes intended by phrases such as: “Any reasonable person would think the same way I do” or “No one who does serious philosophy would fail to see this”, and the like, where the author of the phrase tries to garner sympathizers and defend the idea that his-her statement is objective, absolute and definitive from any point of view).

One of Bunge's targets has always been "relativism" in philosophy. One might always wonder why relativism would be more false or more harmful or more dangerous than dogmatism, why the idea that truth can be attained in many ways would be more dangerous than the idea that truth can be attained only one way. Why would multiplicity be more dangerous than uniqueness? Both can be harmful and dangerous. In fact, the twentieth-century totalitarianisms of both the right and left wings have never been relativistic or skeptical; they have been strongly dogmatic, fanatically convinced of a single and undisputed truth. But leaving this aside and supposing, for the sake of argument, that relativism does pose a real danger, consideration of perspectives other than one's own does not lead to a subjective relativism or a vulgar skepticism, but in any case to a logical relativism that simply states that our conclusions are always relative to the premises we assumed earlier, and that to mean in the conclusions more than there was in the premises is a fallacy. We do not know how the Gods reason, but finite beings like humans can only argue from assumptions and premises, never from nothing.

Therefore, to say that what one concludes depends on the assumptions that one departs from is not a “relativistic” statement, but something that logicians of all times have been repeating. This means something very important: that Mario Bunge's perspective on Heidegger being a charlatan is not absolutely false; for it is something that can be legitimately concluded whenever the assumptions from which Bunge (or others) makes such a statement are accepted. To the extent that it is not merely an emotional statement, and to the extent that Bunge has arguments to defend his stance, what he states about Heidegger is not false; it can be rationally defended. This means that if we accept all of Bunge's assumptions, the conclusion could (or perhaps should) be that Heidegger is a charlatan. But the crucial question is always the same: no one is obliged to accept Bunge's assumptions; we always have the right - at least in a genuine intellectual democracy - to have another philosophical background, another sensibility, other beliefs, other values, other interests, another notion of philosophy, etc., according to which Heidegger is not a charlatan but an important philosopher. .

Whenever a philosophical text irritates us or we do not understand it or it seems irrelevant to us, we are faced with at least two alternatives: (1) The philosophical text has no value; (2) The reader is unable - for one reason or another - to grasp the value of the text. It would not be rational to discard a priori this second alternative. The most reasonable attitude, given the situation of not being able to see the value of a text, would be to say: “This escapes my understanding; it is not a text for me; it's not the kind of philosophy I prefer to read”, or something like that. It does not seem reasonable to declare that a philosophical text is of no value simply because I cannot grasp its value or irritates me. It is not absurd all that I cannot grasp with my background, my intellectual tools, the constitution of my culture, etc. As Wittgenstein once said to Russell, "Don't think that everything you don't understand is nonsense"

One might argue (and it is quite possible that Bunge would argue) that this overly tolerant attitude would leave the way open for all sort of charlatans, liars and dishonest people. He who manifests himself or herself in this way understands that he or she assumes a kind of crusade in favor of rationality in philosophy, having already defined rationality perfectly well and identified its transgressors. I fully agree to advocate rational philosophizing, but I think that rather than summary offensive or ironic statements (like to say that Heidegger's phrases are those of a schizophrenic), it is more rational to develop careful and lengthy lines of argument to try to show that a philosophical writing lacks value or is the product of quackery or dishonesty, giving opportunity to the other party of defending and replicating. Certainly, many serious readers of Heidegger (is it rational to think that they are all wrong or dishonest or were deceived?) may well come up with counterarguments to show that Heidegger is a philosopher who has something important to say, and the Bungians will be able to replicate and so on. This is how we do rational and civilized philosophy.

We have no reason to organize crusades in favor of a specific way of doing philosophy as if we had received an illumination of the absolute Good. The only thing we have in philosophy - at least after the fall of the religious and metaphysical references of the past - are arguments and counterarguments, not dogmas, not even rationalistic dogmas. We cannot set out on a redemptive mission previously guided by an absolute and unchallenged - and perhaps very limited - idea of what is rational and what is quackery in philosophy.

If Bunge replied that he agrees with all of the foregoing, and that when he makes statements like this about Heidegger, it is always elliptically implied that he is merely stating it from his own perspective, not subjective but never unique, and with no intention of disqualifying Heidegger absolutely and definitely, so we all agree and we can drink beer together. If Bunge acknowledges that his statement was simply an emotional outburst without rational justification, that Heidegger simply irritates him in a way that cannot be restrained, we also can understand this, even in a philosopher who has been characterized all his life by the defense of rationality and science against mere emotional attitudes. But if he claims that it is not just a simple emotional outburst, but a rational content that can be defended by arguments, then we are still waiting for these arguments; not single sentence analysis, but serious and careful analysis of texts.

I do not believe that we will build a better world by summarily rejecting, emotionally and without argument, all that we do not understand or have the patience to examine. If we think an idea is pernicious or harmful, the only way to counter it is to argue against it through knowledge, rather than dismissing it as obviously false or dishonest, assuming the role of a guardian of rationality. One of the ideas that has brought the world to the brink of war and total collapse is that it is not worth arguing with the other party, that it must be simply destroyed. When clashes are not argumentative, they can only be based on violence, even if cordial or ironic. For to reject a philosophy or a philosopher without justifying rejection is an act of intellectual violence, which must also be denounced when Heideggerians and existentialists refuse to acknowledge the importance of formal logic, scientific method, and philosophical analysis without knowing anything about the subject.

I hope it has become clear that in this text I did not intend to defend Heidegger against Bunge (I leave this to the Heideggerians, for I am really an analytic philosopher). On the contrary, in this text I have tried to defend rationality against Bunge.

Remark. This occasional article is based on a way of understanding philosophical discussions in general, which was most carefully elaborated in my book “Introduction to a negative approach to argumentation: towards a new ethic for philosophical discussion”. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, forthcoming.